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Compensation Benchmarking, Leapfrogs,
and the Surge in Executive Pay1




Scholars frequently argue whether the sharp rise in chief executive
officer (CEO) pay in recent years is “efficient” or is a consequence
of “rent extraction” because of the failure of corporate governance
in individual firms. This article argues that governance failure must
be conceptualized at the market rather than the firm level because
excessive pay increases for even relatively few CEOs a year spread
to other firms through the cognitively and rhetorically constructed
compensation networks of “peer groups,” which are used in the
benchmarking process to negotiate the compensation of CEOs.
Counterfactual simulation based on Standard and Poor’s Execu-
Comp data demonstrates that the effects of CEO “leapfrogging”
potentially explain a considerable fraction of the overall upward
movement of executive compensation since the early 1990s.
INTRODUCTION
Income inequality has been rising in the United States since the late 1970s,
with most of the increase since the early 1990s being at the top of the
income distribution. Some attribute the increase primarily to technical
factors that have increased demand for education, but others argue that
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this explanation is implausible: technical change is global in character,
and yet earnings inequality rose much more rapidly in the United States
than in other industrialized countries. This anomaly has led scholars to
argue that the explanation for inequality trends must involve institutional
arrangements that determine the setting of pay (Ebbinghaus and Kittel
2005; Kenworthy 2007), the terms of employment (Maurin and Postel-
Vinay 2005; DiPrete et al. 2006), and, more abstractly, the level of “rent”
that can be extracted from specific classes and occupations (Sorensen 2000;
Weeden 2002; Morgan and Tang 2007).2
These debates about labor market trends in general mirror debates
about the pay of American corporate executives, which has increased
rapidly even as earnings in general have risen at the top of the American
distribution. Some scholars argue that corporations have bid up executive
compensation according to the rules of “superstar” labor markets in a
manner that is consistent with a “shareholder value” model of corporate
governance. Others counter that chief executive officer (CEO) compen-
sation rose so rapidly because CEOs gained too much power over the
setting of their own pay. Defenders of the shareholder value theory cite
positive firm-level correlations between pay and performance. Proponents
of the managerial power theory call attention to numerous characteristics
of compensation practices that appear inconsistent with efficient market
practices. Defenders respond that the large increase in compensation dur-
ing the 1990s occurred even as corporate governance in general appeared
to be tightening, not loosening. Critics find plausible evidence of a cor-
relation between the quality of governance in the firm and the compen-
sation of its executives net of performance and other market-relevant
factors. Defenders point to other evidence that questions the impact of
firm-level governance on the rising compensation trend.
Aside from the tremendous cultural power of the shareholder value
model, the debate remains unresolved in large part because opponents
argue on different planes. Proponents of the “pay for performance” model
see the matching of executive talent and firm characteristics as essential
to the production of shareholder value. They see pay being set by the
environment, that is, by a market that defines the executive’s true “op-
portunity cost” and therefore his market wage (zero opportunity cost
equals zero rent). Proponents of the managerial power model assert that
“above-market” pay arises from governance failures at individual firms.
2 The standard definition of economic rent is the difference between the returns to a
given factor of production and its opportunity cost, i.e., its returns in the best alter-
native. Those who win access to high-paying positions that are in limited supply can
be paid much better in these positions than they could elsewhere, which implies a high
“rent” component of their earnings.
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Neither of these positions adequately captures the implications of the
interaction between firm and environment, which provides a structural
basis for rent extraction. We favor a third explanation that emphasizes
the systemic implications of managerial power. According to this third
explanation, the complexity and dynamism of compensation comparison
groups produce a mechanism by which governance failures in individual
firms propagate through corporate networks via the normal workings of
the benchmarking system to raise executive salaries.
We show that a small and shifting fraction of CEOs have regularly
been able to “leapfrog” their compensation benchmarks by moving to the
right tail of the benchmark distribution and get larger than normative
compensation increases, even after taking job mobility and executive per-
formance into account. These events produce subsequent “legitimate” pay
increases for others and potentially explain an important fraction of the
overall upward movement of executive compensation over the past 15
years. Aside from being consistent with the the concept of “strategic con-
formity” that is frequently postulated by economic sociology institution-
alists, this result implies that the concept of firm-level governance of
corporate compensation is inherently flawed; the linkages among firms
produced by the benchmarking process guarantee that firm-level gover-
nance failure becomes a factor in the environment of other firms. In other
words, rent extraction takes place even when CEOs are paid their “market
wage” as established by competitive benchmarks. This argument supports
the recent attention in the stratification literature to rent extraction as a
manifestation of occupational power rather than an outcome of the bar-
gaining power of individual workers.
INEQUALITY, RENT EXTRACTION, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF
MARKETS
Theories for the rapid rise in American earnings inequality fall into two
basic camps. One emphasizes rising demand for educational skills that is
driven largely by technical change and a failure of the supply of college-
educated workers to keep up (Katz and Autor 1999; Goldin and Katz
2008). Another emphasizes changes in the ability of workers in different
occupations to extract rents. Rent seeking included what Sorensen (1996,
2000) called the “zero-sum competition for positional goods” (2000, p.
1544), where the quasi “zero-sum” character comes from “social closure”
processes such as licensing that restrict occupational access (Weeden 2002).
Rent seeking also included the competition between owners and employ-
ees for gains obtained from favorable market positions produced by a
specific combination of capital and labor inputs. For example, Sorensen
American Journal of Sociology
1674
(2000) saw executive pay as a form of rent; executives used their control
of productive assets such as cash flows and information to manipulate
corporate governance processes that ostensibly protect the interests of
shareholders.3 Changes in the relative strength of owners and employers
could increase rents going to employees or decrease them. Thus, Sorensen
speculated that selective destruction of rent for many labor market po-
sitions was raising inequality in America, which received empirical sup-
port from Morgan and Tang (2007).4
While the social closure literature has mostly focused on the control of
access to desirable positions throughout the labor market, the question of
how pay is set for executive positions in large organizations is of equal
importance, both because of what it says about income inequality and
because it provides a strategic research site for studying how the distri-
bution of rents relates to the efficiency of markets. The fundamental
theoretical question can be stated simply: Does lofty and historically rising
executive compensation represent a failure of governance, which reduces
shareholder value and produces economic inefficiency alongside high eco-
nomic rents? Or does it enhance shareholder value through the optimal
matching of specific labor assets (rare entrepreneurial and managerial
talent) and the capital assets of corporations?
The classical framing of the governance question surrounding executive
compensation is the theory of managerialism formulated by Berle and
Means (1932), which argued that managers act in their own interests at
the expense of the interests of shareholders. The theory of shareholder
value (also referred to as the “contractarian” approach to corporate gov-
ernance; see Davis 2005) rejected this conclusion. According to the theory
of shareholder value, financial markets disciplined managers to act in the
interest of shareholders, and labor markets disciplined firms to compensate
executives according to their performance (Fama 1980).5 The theory that
managers should run corporations to create shareholder value became the
dominant corporate ideology during the 1980s (Davis 2005; see also Flig-
stein 1990) and was the basis for the movement to increase the weight of
equity and other “at-risk” compensation in executive compensation pack-
ages in order to align their interests more closely with those of shareholders
3 The possibility that executive compensation involves rents has been recognized by
at least some economists for many decades (Marshall 1920; Hicks 1948; see especially
Roberts 1956).
4 Morgan and Tang found that the interindustry variance in wages declined from 1983
to 2001; the relative earnings of those at the bottom of the class distribution have also
declined.
5 The theory of shareholder value received early empirical support from research show-
ing that manager-controlled firms performed as well as owner-controlled firms (Demsetz
and Lehn 1985; Short 1994).
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(Useem 1993). The competing positions of managerialism and the theory
of shareholder value continue to frame the contemporary debate.
A key theoretical issue in the debate over executive compensation con-
cerns the distinction between the questions “where does governance come
from?” and “how well does governance work?” From the perspective of
the theory of shareholder value, these questions amount to the same thing;
that is, the answer to “where does governance come from?” is “the market,”
and the answer to “how well does governance work?” is that “market
discipline produces optimal shareholder value.” Economic sociology sees
these questions as fundamentally separate. As argued in recent reviews
of this literature (Davis 2005; Fligstein and Choo 2005; Fligstein and
Dauter 2007), much of the sociological literature concerns the documen-
tation that corporate governance responds to institutional as well as mar-
ket imperatives, with a principal institutional force being the historically
changing set of cultural conceptions about how markets should work
(Fligstein 2002). Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002), meanwhile, question
from a legal perspective the effectiveness of corporate governance in their
critique of “optimal contracting theory” via their core assertion that “there
is no contract that would perfectly align the interests of managers and
shareholders” (p. 751).
The failure of optimal contracting theory, according to Bebchuk et al.
(2002; see also Bebchuk and Fried 2004), stems from the lack of arm’s-
length bargaining between executives and boards and the power of man-
agers to legitimize and otherwise “camouflage” the extraction of rents from
the corporation.6 Evidence for rent extraction in the managerial power
literature takes two forms. One form of evidence consists of behavior that
can be accounted for by a managerial power theory but cannot readily
be accounted for by an optimal contract theory, including (a) the general
failure of companies to index stock options so that executives would not
be rewarded for general stock price rises unrelated to own-firm perfor-
mance (even as they tend to protect executives against “bad-luck” events
that affect share prices), (b) the general failure of companies to award
“out-of-the-money” options (even though empirical evidence exists that
such options would boost shareholder value), (c) the resetting of option
exercise prices when the options move out of the money (even when the
stock declines because of poor firm performance), (d) the allowing of
executives to hedge against equity exposure (thereby undermining the
6 These arguments parallel in some respects those of Nelson and Bridges (1999), who
show how firms treated “market forces” as an environmental factor that could be
responded to selectively in order to produce a desired gender structure in corporate
compensation. Useem (1993) describes how top management often maintained consid-
erable influence over directors even in the face of rising shareholder activism during
the ascendancy of the shareholder value movement.
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incentive to perform), (e) the timing of stock option grants just preceding
favorable corporate news, and ( f ) the backdating of options to correspond
with market dips in the company’s stock (Yermack 1997; Brenner, Sun-
daram, and Yermack 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk
et al. 2002; Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer 2006;
Kuhnen and Zwiebel 2007).
The second form of evidence for managerial power theory is the firm-
level relationship between managerial power and executive compensation.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) argued that the rules of governance
that define “power sharing” between shareholders and boards vary across
firms, with some resembling “democracies” and others “dictatorships,” and
that much of the variation in governance evolved in the 1980s as strategies
to limit the impact of investor activism.7 Several empirical studies have
shown that high managerial power and weak governance structures are
correlated with higher levels of CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker 1999; Bebchuk et al. 2002; Ang and Nagel 2006; Armstrong,
Ittner, and Larcker 2008; Gabaix and Landier 2008).8
Proponents of the pay for performance model argue, in opposition to
managerial power theory, that variations in pay and changes in pay over
time are a market-driven consequence of “superstar” labor markets (Jen-
sen and Murphy 1990; Hall and Liebman 1998; Himmelberg and Hubbard
2000; Murphy and Za´bojnı´k 2004a; Gabaix and Landier 2008). Gabaix
and Landier’s model is illustrative. They argue that CEO talent is worth
more in larger firms, and this presumption provides an incentive for firms
to hire and pay so that CEO talent and firm size become positively cor-
related. Under the assumption that talent and firm size were distributed
according to a power law, their model produces highly skewed payments
to CEOs at the largest firms. At the same time, their model produces an
efficient sorting of talent across companies with corresponding gains in
both profit to firms and compensation to executives even as it produces
“composite rents” that are shared between corporations and executives.
The empirical demonstration in this literature that pay, performance, and
firm size are statistically related is interpreted as evidence that typical
7 Gompers et al. found that the “democracy” portfolio outperformed the “dictatorship”
portfolio by 8.5% per year. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) found that six of the
provisions monitored by the Investment Responsibility Research Center—staggered
boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements
for mergers and for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachute arrange-
ments—account for most of the relationship between governance and stockholder
returns.
8 Gabaix and Landier (2008), e.g., found that a 2-SD drop in the quality of corporate
governance was associated with an 11.4% increase in CEO compensation. They noted
that this effect was “small compared to the dramatic increase in pay” (p. 70).
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supply and demand factors are working in the executive labor market,
just as they work in typical labor markets.
For those focused on trends in income inequality, the most salient aspect
of executive compensation is not the variation in pay across companies,
but rather the upward “ratcheting” of executive compensation, that is,
the fact that executive compensation rose throughout the 1980s and 1990s
at a faster pace than average wages, average managerial wages, or even
corporate earnings. Ang and Nagel (2006) operationalized ratcheting as
when CEOs are paid more in year t than one would predict on the basis
of the pay for performance model for the prior year. They found that the
proportion of CEOs getting higher than predicted compensation rose from
53% in the 1970s to 57% in the 1980s and 1990s, which—they argued—
leads to a persistent rise in mean and median compensation.9 This upward
ratcheting coincided with the tendency for corporations to provide a larger
share of executive pay in equity-based incentive schemes, which was
justified as a closer alignment of the interests of managers and stock-
holders (Useem 1993).
Proponents of managerial power theory view the pattern of upward
ratcheting of executive compensation as evidence of increasing rent ex-
traction by executives from poorly governed corporations. Advocates of
the pay for performance model, however, counter that managerial power
theory does a poor job of accounting for the upward trend in CEO com-
pensation. For example, Murphy and Za´bojnı´k (2004a) wrote that “the
Bebchuk et al hypothesis does not provide a satisfactory reason for the
increase [emphasis theirs] in CEO pay. Surely, CEOs were trying to extract
rents even 30 years ago. But then, one would have to argue that over
time the boards of directors became more and more captive. However, if
anything, the opposite appears to be true” (p. 192). Several other studies
report that corporate governance was becoming more effective in the
1990s even as salaries were ratcheting upward (Holmstrom and Kaplan
2001; Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Hermalin 2005). Additionally, some stud-
ies fail to find evidence that poor governance is linked to upward ratch-
9 Nagel (2007) further finds an inflation-adjusted increase of at least 5.5% per year in
median Standard and Poor’s (S&P) pay in the early 1980s after taking performance
into account and finds that much of this increase stems from the increased use of pay
surveys and the corresponding rise in pay of CEOs who were paid less than similarly
performing peer CEOs. According to Nagel, the percentage of those who are “persis-
tently underpaid” drops from 39% in the 1970s to 32% in the 1980s. He also finds
that the percentage of persistently underpaid CEOs further decreased in the 1990s
after line-item CEO pay was disclosed starting in 1992, as did the percentage of
persistently overpaid CEOs, which he attributes to improvements in governance. Biz-
jak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2007) also found that CEOs who were below the median
of their natural benchmark population received larger raises in compensation over the
1992–2005 period of time.
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eting of executive compensation (Bizjak et al. 2007; Gabaix and Landier
2008).10
Defenders of the pay for performance model argue instead for a market
explanation for rising executive compensation. Gabaix and Landier (2008),
for example, argue that the marginal value of a CEO’s talent increases
with the value of the firm under his control and that this proposed re-
lationship leads to an “efficient” bidding up of CEO compensation as firm
size goes up in order to achieve the optimal sorting of CEO talent and
firm size. Gabaix and Landier claimed to find—in contrast to Bebchuk
and Grinstein (2005)—that all of the increase in CEO pay since 1992
could be explained by optimal sorting in the presence of observed increases
in firm size.11 This argument, however, was challenged as unpersuasive
by proponents of the managerial power model. Nagel (2008) replicated
their study with a revised sample and—like Bebchuk and Grinstein
(2005)—found that firm size explains only 50% of the increase in com-
pensation. In addition to this problem, the Gabaix and Landier expla-
nation relies on strong assumptions about the interactive effect of talent
and firm size on performance and about the functional form of the un-
observed distribution of talent in the population of executives and would-
be executives.12
10 Bizjak et al. (2007) found no evidence that pay increases to CEOs ranked below the
median of their peer groups were linked to standard measures of poor governance.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) tested the governance failure theory by testing for whether
compensation returns for being the executive of a poorly governed firm rise with stock
market performance, and the test failed, which they interpreted as evidence against
the idea that “skimming” produces ratcheting. Other scholars argue more neutrally
that upward ratcheting was an information problem; boards failed to accurately es-
timate the true cost of stock options to the firm (Hall and Murphy 2003).
11 Other arguments include that CEOs were previously paid too low and there is a
one-time catch-up that occurred (Jensen and Murphy 1990); that market booms in-
crease the demand for CEO talent and produce an increase in pay (Himmelberg and
Hubbard 2000); that “general managerial skill” as opposed to firm-specific skill has
become more valuable, which has produced increased competition by firms for external
CEOs (Murphy and Za´bojnı´k 2004a); that the higher risk of firing due to strengthened
corporate governance produced higher compensation to offset the risk (Hermalin 2005);
and that it is too costly for firms to index CEO contracts so that they do not reward
“luck” (Oyer 2004). Murphy (2002) and Hall and Murphy (2003) attribute the rise in
stock options not so much to managerial power as to board ignorance about how much
the options are worth.
12 Gabaix and Landier provide an equilibrium result that shows how equilibrium
salaries change as a function of the fraction of firms that propose to provide increased
compensation to their CEOs, and they report that if 10% of firms want to double
compensation, this will lead to a doubling of all CEO compensation in equilibrium.
However, their formula implies implausibly high equilibrium pay levels as the pro-




Much of the empirical evidence put forward to support either the man-
agerial power or the pay for performance theory searches for statistical
patterns between firm-level, industry-level, and executive-level charac-
teristics on the one hand and compensation on the other. Economic so-
ciology, in contrast, favors explanations that focus either on the interaction
between local governance and the broader governance environment or
on the impact of network ties on economic outcomes. The market gov-
ernance literature addresses how the national environment responds to
political and cultural, as well as functional, imperatives and how local
governance involves “strategic efforts at conformity” in order to produce
favorable evaluations from institutional third parties and correspondingly
higher share prices and business opportunities (Davis 2005; Fligstein and
Dauter 2007).13 The network literature argues that specific ties among
market participants create a pattern of information flow within subnet-
works that affects transactions and prices (Baker 1984; Burt 1992; Miz-
ruchi and Stearns 2001). Specific ties among market participants also
directly enhance or diminish the status of these participants and thereby
affect their perceived quality and their price and cost structure (Podolny
2005). The pay for performance model is admittedly also relational in the
sense that all economic models are relational; that is, pay setters look at
both local performance and competitive pressures from the market when
deciding how much compensation to offer their employees. We see three
important questions that need to be addressed in order to establish the
differences in these approaches. First, what part of the market does the
firm’s compensation committee look at when it sets pay; that is, what is
the network structure and the content of the network ties between ex-
ecutives and the environment that are implied by pay comparisons? Sec-
ond, how controlling are these comparisons on pay determination? Third,
how does pay setting in response (or not) to these comparisons propagate
through the comparison networks that are set up by the compensation
process?
COMPENSATION BENCHMARKING
When rates of external hiring of executives were low, social scientists
debated whether executives were paid on the basis of comparisons to the
13 Examples of symbolic and strategic action, which traces back to the work of Meyer
and Rowan (1977), include stock repurchase plans (Westphal and Zajac 2001), long-
term incentive compensation (Westphal and Zajac 1994, 1998), use of consultants and
peer groups to justify executive compensation (Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999), and
discretionary reliance alternatively on market or accounting returns as justifications
for executive pay (Wade, Porac, and Pollock 1997).
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“external” labor market or the “internal” labor market (Roberts 1956;
Simon 1957), even as earlier empirical studies suggested that executive
pay was determined by a combination of these forces (Patton 1951). Cer-
tainly by the late 1970s, however, the setting of executive pay often in-
volved institutionalized comparisons between the company’s own exec-
utive compensation practices and those of “a list of companies comparable
to [the compensation director’s] organization” (Cook 1981, p. 39). As the
practice of recruiting external CEOs became more prevalent and devel-
oped its own set of institutions (Khurana 2002; Murphy and Za´bojnı´k
2004b), so did the explicit use of benchmarking and labor market analysis
as the normatively prescribed model for setting executive compensation.
The benchmarking process is well described in contemporary compen-
sation manuals produced by compensation consultants (e.g., Reda, Reifler,
and Thatcher 2008). Some parts of this “standard model” have been in-
corporated into regulatory practices monitored by regulatory agencies,
and company adherence at least to the formal characteristics of this pro-
cess has been well documented.14 The first step is for compensation com-
mittees to assess current pay (often, actual pay is not immediately obvious,
given the complexities of executive compensation). The next step is a
labor market analysis. As one compensation manual describes, “Com-
pensation committees are constantly examining whether the compensation
levels of the top executives are reasonable and adequate. This is done for
two reasons. First is to ensure that the pay levels are competitive, because
if they are not (otherwise referred to as ‘below market’) another company
may try to ‘raid the executive talent pool.’ Second is to ensure that the
compensation levels are neither too high nor too disproportionate (i.e.,
that there is reasonable balance between salary, annual bonus, long-term
incentives, pension, and so on)” (Reda et al. 2008, p. 24). To accomplish
this process, compensation consultants are called in and a peer group for
the company’s executives is identified. New compensation is determined
relative to the compensation of the executives in the peer group via ne-
gotiations with the CEO.
A number of studies of executive compensation have documented the
widespread use of peer groups in the process of setting executive com-
pensation (Porac et al. 1999; Bizjak et al. 2007; Faulkender and Yang
2010), but the interpretation of this practice varies widely. Holmstrom
14 Crystal (1991) found extensive evidence for the use of benchmarking in the 1980s.
More recently, Bizjak et al. (2007) found that 96 of 100 S&P 500 firms that were
sampled in 1997 asserted that they used peer groups in their proxies. Ang and Nagel
(2006) found the same percentage in their S&P 500 sample. Whether compensation
committees actually consistently behave in ways that compensation consultants rec-
ommend is, of course, an open question, and one whose answer might be different
under the current regulatory environment than it was in the 1990s.
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and Kaplan recently wrote that “prices, including wages, are ultimately
set by supply and demand, and benchmarking is nothing more than look-
ing at market prices” (2003, p. 19). They went on to argue that “the main
problem with executive pay levels is not the overall level, but the extreme
skew in the awards . . . . To deal with this problem, we need more
effective benchmarking, not less of it.” Bizjak et al. (2007) similarly con-
cluded that the practice of benchmarking against peers is used by cor-
porations to retain CEOs by determining their reservation wage. Faulk-
ender and Yang (2010), in contrast, found that firms tend to favor peer
groups where the CEO was more highly paid and will forgo including
lower-paid CEOs in the same industry in favor of higher-paid CEOs
outside of the industry.
Clearly, differing outcomes in the peer group selection process can imply
different applications of network principles in the construction of these
networks. The perspective of Holmstrom and Kaplan implies that com-
pensation networks are constructed such that individuals in the peer group
are equivalently situated with respect to a labor market. At the same time,
the research of Faulkender and Yang (2010) implies that the CEOs in-
cluded in the peer group are not a simple random sample of the firms
that would be included on the basis of a reasonable definition of the labor
market. This suggests that “labor market comparability” is not an ade-
quate explanation for how peer groups are selected.
The favoring of more highly paid CEOs calls to mind Gould’s (2002)
and Podolny’s (2005) conceptions of network ties as bases for the accretion
of status, which gives actors an incentive to create ties with the highest-
status individuals in order to gain status themselves. However, their mod-
els posit a mechanism that limits this status-seeking process, namely, the
need for ties to be reciprocal. Efforts to form ties with higher-status actors
in their models are often not reciprocated either because of time constraints
on the potential number of ties that one can reciprocate (in Gould’s model)
or to avoid the degradation of one’s own status that comes from asso-
ciating with lower-status actors (in Podolny’s model).
Compensation networks differ from Gould’s or Podolny’s networks in
the important respect of being cognitive, not social, networks, where ties
need not be reciprocated (Kilduff and Krackhardt 1994). To include a
particular CEO in one’s peer group is to make a rhetorical assertion that
the claimed peer is part of the relevant labor market. The motives for
the asserted ties are similar (the desire to express comparability with a
highly compensated alter is similar to the desire to be accepted as having
business ties with a high-status firm in Podolny’s model). However, the
mechanism by which the asserted peer group tie becomes “real” occurs
not through its being reciprocated, but rather when it is accepted by the
board and used in the setting of pay. It is, of course, quite possible that
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assertion and acceptance of these cognitive networks are influenced by
actual social ties, that is, business ties among firms as well as social ties
among executives and board members within and across firms. The pro-
cess may also be influenced by whether the peer group membership is
easily discoverable by shareholders and interested third parties. Until
recent years, the level of transparency was low, but this has gradually
changed as firms slowly move into compliance with the 2006 Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements that peer groups be
named in the corporation’s yearly proxy report if the company used bench-
marking to set executive pay.
MECHANISMS LINKING COMPENSATION BENCHMARKING TO
SECULAR RISES IN PAY
Defenders of CEO compensation levels argue that CEOs do not extract
rent because they are being compensated at their reservation wage, which
is set by an open and functioning market for executive talent. The eco-
nomic sociology emphasis on the interface between the institutional en-
vironment and firm-level actions provides an alternative basis for con-
cluding that rent capture can occur even in the presence of firm-level
competition for CEO talent because rent capture by one CEO produces
a higher benchmark that other CEOs can point to as the “market” price.
Defenders of CEO compensation levels typically treat governance failure
as a firm-level rather than an environmental issue (“Despite its alleged
flaws, the U.S. corporate governance system has performed very well”
[Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003, p. 20]) and argue that the evidence supports
labor market pressure rather than governance as an explanation for ex-
ecutive salaries. The environmental perspective, however, questions this
logic as fundamentally flawed to the extent that the failure of governance
at one firm can then influence the competition at other firms through the
selection of the overcompensated CEO as a peer. The influence is mag-
nified if the overcompensated CEO is more likely to be selected as a peer
precisely because his compensation is high. The feedback in this process,
moreover, has the potential to generate ratcheting to the extent that firm-
level governance failures continue to occur even sporadically.
Existing studies of ratcheting processes focus on changes over time in
the median or in the likelihood that below-median CEOs will have larger
than average increases (Ang and Nagel 2006; Nagel 2007, 2008). In con-
trast, our study examines how a relatively small fraction of above-nor-
mative jumps to the right tail of the benchmark distribution, which we
describe as “leapfrogging,” could affect the evolution of the entire distri-
bution of executive compensation over time. For scholars such as Holm-
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strom and Kaplan (2003), leapfrogging (at least if it is “excessive”) becomes
a problem of “excessive skew” and an illustration of governance failure
in a small number of firms within a system of governance that works
well because it identifies the appropriate “market wage” for the great
majority of CEOs. This view is inadequate because the benchmarking
system contains feedback loops that transform governance problems in
some firms into a market reality for others. In this section, we discuss a
set of mechanisms that potentially can link benchmarking to secular trends
in corporate executive compensation, and then we explore how relatively
low rates of leapfrogging can influence the evolution of the distribution
of CEO compensation over time. We do not argue that leapfrogging is
the only mechanism by which upward ratcheting of pay could occur.
Indeed, we expect that managerial power can and would be expressed
through other mechanisms, including the control of information about
the value of equity and other incentive components of executive com-
pensation (Sorensen 2000; Hall and Murphy 2003) and the mechanism
involving below-median pay examined by Ang and Nagel.15 We do argue,
however, that leapfrogging is a powerful mechanism for ratcheting pay
because it allows individual expressions of managerial power at some
firms to change benchmarks and thereby affect the pay of CEOs through-
out the corporate world.
Our starting point rests on two presumptions. The first is that there is
a “natural” group of companies that are “peers” of any given company
for purposes of setting compensation, but at the same time, there are
ambiguities in the actual identification of these peers that allows for the
latitude of discretion. These commonsense but ambiguous criteria can be
seen in the wording of compensation guidelines: “Peer companies generally
are selected based on similarities to the subject company in terms of
revenues, market capitalization and/or industry, oftentimes using Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes that are the same as or similar
to the subject company . . . [such that they are] representative of an
appropriate ‘market’” (Reda et al. 2008, p. 25).16 The second presumption
15 Shifts in accounting and tax policies as well as the growing dominance of the share-
holder value paradigm may have contributed to the increased weight of equity com-
pensation in the typical executive compensation package. Patton (1951) argued that
the high marginal tax rates of the late 1940s caused companies to limit the ratio of
equity to cash compensation so that their executives would be able to use their cash
in order to pay the taxes on their equity compensation. More recently, Internal Revenue
Service and accounting regulations concerning the implications of equity compensation
for corporate profitability created incentives for corporations to use equity-based pay
for their top executives.
16 Data from Faulkender and Yang (2010) showed that industry and size are standard
criteria for inclusion in peer groups. Other studies have also established the normative
use of industry and firm size as the principal basis for defining peers.
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is that the complexities of executive compensation make the process of
locating the compensation of the focal executive within this distribution
less than transparent. Ambiguities in the selection of peer groups and in
the placement of executives within the benchmark distribution create
multiple opportunities to enhance the compensation of the focal executive.
One mechanism could be termed biased sampling from peer group pop-
ulations. Even if an appropriate peer group population was identified,
selections from this population might be nonrandom and produce a higher
peer group compensation distribution. A second and related mechanism
is the use of what we term “aspiration peer groups” instead of comparable
peer groups. Aspiration peer groups are drawn from populations of firms
that are bigger than the target firm (and therefore typically have more
highly compensated CEOs) on the grounds that the current CEO has the
talent to increase his current employer to the size of the aspiration com-
panies. Aspiration peer groups will generally consist of highly paid peers,
and CEOs have an obvious incentive to claim as highly paid a group of
“peers” as possible up to the limits of what can be justified as a plausible
comparison group.17 A third mechanism is the use of ambitious escalators
to update the available lagged data about compensation of peer group
executives when computing appropriate pay for the focal executive. A
fourth mechanism, which is described in the work of Ang and Nagel (Ang
and Nagel 2006; Nagel 2007), concerns relatively large increases in pay
to CEOs who are below the median of their benchmark distributions. A
fifth mechanism, which is the topic of our empirical focus, is the bench-
marking of a relatively small fraction of executives to points in the com-
pensation distribution that are higher than normative.
Analyses of firm proxy statements demonstrate that corporations live
in a “Lake Wobegon” world where no one should be below average and
many are above average. Crystal (1991) found that 35% of surveyed firms
aimed to pay at the 75th percentile and 65% aimed at the 50th percentile.
Bizjak et al. (2007) found that 73% of firms in their sample of 100 S&P
500 firms in 1997 targeted the mean or the median of the distribution,
whereas most of the remaining firms did not mention their percentile
target in their proxy statements. Ang and Nagel (2006) found that between
46% and 66% of firms in the S&P 100 targeted their CEO compensation
at above the median of the peer group. Using a sample of S&P 500
companies for 2005 and 2006, Faulkender and Yang (2010) produced
evidence in the cross section that the particular selection of peers—in
particular, the 50th and 75th percentiles of compensation within the peer
group—has a statistically significant effect on focal CEO compensation,
17 Han (1994) writes about the process of status seeking through aspirational group
membership in the context of choice of auditing firm by American corporations.
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net of standard pay and performance variables. Their finding implies that
the upper end of the benchmark distribution indeed affects pay in the
cross section. Faulkender and Yang also found that peer groups tend to
be somewhat larger firms than the focal firm, that potential firms from
the same industry that were excluded from the peer group tend to have
relatively low CEO compensation, and that “peer” CEOs from outside
the industry tend to have relatively high CEO compensation. Their find-
ings are consistent with the managerial power model of compensation
setting. In other words, corporations appear to use both biased sampling
and aspiration peer groups in order to justify higher executive compen-
sation.18
If peer groups were stable over time and if all firms benchmarked to
the 55th percentile, then pay within peer groups would rise such that all
low-paid CEOs were paid at the 55th percentile, and thereafter, the dis-
tribution would remain stable. Increased pay from one year to the next
would be generated by the escalator that firms used to update the lagged
benchmark pay when determining pay for this year. However, this model
is incomplete because it gives no guidance for CEOs whose pay was
already above the 55th percentile of their peer group. Pay increases in
this simple model for already highly paid CEOs depend only on the
escalator and whatever other performance measures that are used to jus-
tify relatively high compensation relative to peers, however they were
selected.
Suppose instead that peer groups were stable and that everyone was
paid to the 55th percentile in the peer distribution except for a small
fraction of above-median CEOs who leapfrogged to the right tail. This
leapfrogging would create right skew but would not affect the pay point
for firms below the 55th percentile. If, however, enough firms leapfrog
from the bottom 55% of the distribution, they shift the pay point to the
right; one must now count up to higher-paid CEOs to reach the new 55th
percentile. The increase in pay from one year to the next becomes the
sum of the escalator plus the difference between the new pay point and
the old pay point.
This second thought experiment is also limited because it presumes
stable peer groups. In reality, peer groups are not stable. Even the
“natural” peer groups (as defined by firm size and industry) would not
remain the same over time given that the relative market cap (and in
some cases even industry) of firms will change over time. Along with the
potentially very powerful force of temporally variable strategic selection
of peers based on CEO compensation (Faulkender and Yang 2010), firm
18 Faulkender and Yang (2010) also find limited, though not definitive, evidence that
these procedures are more common at poorly governed firms.
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mobility across the space that defines natural peer groups magnifies the
possibility that the destination compensation of leapfrogs will directly
affect the pay point of benchmark distributions for other firms. In such
a situation, leapfrogging creates a ratcheting effect that drives the dis-
tribution of CEO pay to the right.
There is an important distinction between superstar “tournament” mod-
els of compensation (Rosenbaum 1979; Rosen 1981), which have also been
described as “winner take all” markets (Frank and Cook 1995), and bench-
marking models of compensation, which have more the character of
environment-level cumulative advantage models (DiPrete and Eirich
2006), and therefore are better described as “winners spread the wealth”
models. A winner take all model is one in which the rewards at the top
of the distribution are far above the average and there is no feedback
between rewards at the median and rewards in the right tail. The superstar
model provides a static justification for very high pay for superstars, or,
in our context, CEOs. A winner spread the wealth model is one that
contains a feedback mechanism, which in the case of benchmarking works
through social comparison. A model in which top executives were paid
a fixed percentage of the company’s revenue would produce a high-
variance, right-skewed distribution of compensation with no feedback.
In effect, this would be a “tournament” model in which the executives
who won the slots at the head of the biggest companies were the big
winners even among the class of winners who head public corporations.
A model in which pay was set relative to the pay of others has the potential
to produce escalating pay for everyone, whenever poor governance or
even luck raises the pay of a fraction of executives who then function as
compensation reference points for other executives. A model in which pay
is set relative to the pay of others implies that market governance is
inherently a systemwide as well as a firm-level phenomenon. Systemwide
governance failure can occur when pay at both “well-governed” and
“poorly governed” firms rises on the basis of a combination of a potentially
small number of questionably large pay increases that feed back through
the benchmarking system. The next sections of this paper describe our
data and methods and present estimates of the potential cumulative mag-
nitude of these feedback effects over time.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We analyzed information obtained from the S&P ExecuComp database,
which provides information about executive compensation and firm per-
formance for firms in the S&P 500, S&P Mid-Cap 400, and S&P Small-
Cap 600 indices at some point since 1992. These data, which are described
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in detail on the S&P website (http://umi.compustat.com), contain infor-
mation about total yearly compensation for the five highest-paid execu-
tives in the firm each year, including salary, bonus, stock option grants,
and grants of stock. Basic demographic information is also available in-
cluding age and gender and date of hire and of separation if applicable.
The starting and ending dates of tenure as CEO are available for CEOs,
and mobility among corporations can be tracked because the names of
each executive are contained in the data. The ExecuComp database con-
tains several important company characteristics including industry, sales,
assets, number of employees, revenues, return on assets, return on equity,
net income, stock price, and yearly return to shareholders (including div-
idends). We limited the sample to current CEOs for the analyses reported
in this article.
First we provide descriptive information about the change in the dis-
tribution of compensation and about compensation mobility of individual
CEOs, and then we present results from counterfactual simulations that
estimate the impact of leapfrogging on mean and median changes in
executive compensation over time.
Figure 1 shows the tremendous rate of increase in mean total compen-
sation for CEOs in the ExecuComp data, and figure 2 shows the observed
mean and median change in salary plus bonus (salary/bonus). Adjusted
for inflation, the median salary/bonus increased from 1993 through 2005
by 40%, whereas the mean increased by 58%. Adjusted for inflation, the
median total compensation went from $1.6 million to $3.2 million, a 106%
increase, whereas the mean increased by 116%. In 2006, the typical salary/
bonus package dropped considerably in the ExecuComp data, but the
total compensation rose to a mean of $7.1 million, a 175% increase over
its value in 1993. In contrast, mean annual compensation in domestic
industries in the United States as a whole rose in this period by only
15%.19
This strong upward movement in the overall distribution occurred con-
currently with high year-by-year mobility in both the upward and down-
ward direction for individual executives. Table 1 shows the distribution
of percentage changes in pay for CEOs during these years. As is evident,
movement down as well as up was common. Much of the reason for this
high year-to-year mobility was that CEOs typically receive various forms
of “incentive” compensation that is not necessarily awarded every year,
including stock options and long-term incentive payments. CEO year-to-
year mobility is much higher than is typical for American workers. Burk-
hauser, Holtz-Eakin, and Rhody (1997) report that 75% of American
19 Table 622, U.S. Statistical Abstract, 2008 (for year 2005), and table 672, U.S. Statistical
Abstract, 1995 (for year 1993).
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Fig. 1.—Mean CEO compensation, by year (from S&P ExecuComp data)
Fig. 2.—Median value of total compensation and major components of CEO total com-
pensation, by year (from S&P ExecuComp data).
workers in the bottom quintile, between 60% and 65% of those in the
middle quintiles, and 84% of those in the top quintile remain in their
same quintile of the labor earnings distribution from one year to the next.
In contrast, 66% of CEOs in the bottom quintile, between 42% and 47%
in the middle quintiles, and 68% in the top quintile remain in the same
quintile the following year with respect to total compensation. Mobility
in the salary and bonus component of total compensation is lower but (at














1 (bottom) . . . 88 77 45 69
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 52 49 49
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 47 51 44
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 53 46 49
5 (top) . . . . . . . 90 71 59 66
Note.—Data are taken from the ExecuComp database. Sample size (in person-years) is 17,277.
TABLE 2
Percentage of Top Quintile Who
Were in the Bottom 60% of the
Distribution in the Previous Year
Compensation Type Percentage
Salary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5
Salary  bonus . . . . . . . 6.8
Stock options . . . . . . . . . . 19.2
Total compensation . . . 13.1
Note.—Date are taken from the ExecuComp
database. Sample size (in person-years) is 17,277.
is still higher than for the typical worker.20 Table 2 further shows that
long-range mobility was also relatively common for CEOs, with consid-
erable mobility from the middle and lower parts of the income distribution
to the top quintile within a single year’s time.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the average yearly increase in total
compensation and in salary/bonus for the years in which the CEO is
present in the data, where values smaller than a 30% average decline and
larger than a 100% average increase were truncated at these values and
only CEOs with at least four years of data are presented.21 Clearly, at the
individual level, compensation careers were highly variable, though with
a positive bias; the median yearly increase in total compensation was
9.7% and the median yearly increase in salary/bonus was 5.1%. For CEOs
20 These comparisons understate the difference because they are conditional on the
individual being a CEO in consecutive years, and an important source of mobility in
the general population is occupational change.
21 Denote the average increase as r and let be the natural logarithm of the lastyN
observed compensation, be the natural logarithm of the first observed compensation,y1
and n be the number of years in which the CEO was observed. Then 1 rp
.exp [(y  y )/(n 1)]N 1
Fig. 3.—Average rate of compensation change for CEOs. a, Total compensation. b, Salary
plus bonus. Notes: N (ever moved) p 317; N (never moved) p 2,348. Sample restricted to
those who were observed as CEOs in at least four years. 0 p no increase, 0.5 corresponds
to a 50% increase, 1 corresponds to a 100% increase, etc.
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who were in the data at least four years, the mean increase from the first
through the last year was 6.3% in mean salary/bonus and 11.5% in total
compensation.
As figure 3 shows, CEO firm changers did better as a group than stayers.
According to the ExecuComp data, 11.2% of the 6,206 individuals who
were CEOs of a sample company during our observation period moved
to another company, and 14.2% of all CEO records were those of CEOs
who at some point moved from one CEO job to another in the data.
CEOs who changed companies had mean average increases in total com-
pensation of 20.7% and 10.3% in salary/bonus as compared with 14.0%
for total compensation and 8.9% in salary/bonus for those who remained
with only a single company.
SIMULATING THE EFFECTS OF LEAPFROGGING: METHODS
Imputing the Peer Groups
To estimate the impact of leapfrogging on the overall rate of growth of
executive compensation, we analyzed compensation trends in the
ExecuComp data by means of counterfactual simulations. In the historical
data, the peer groups that were actually used by compensation committees
are not known (an SEC requirement that peer groups be named was not
instituted until 2006, and many firms delayed complying with this re-
quirement for one or more years [Pittinsky and DiPrete 2010]). Instead
we have the principles that compensation consultants and companies say
they used in choosing peer groups. We used this information to impute
peer groups. Because there is more than one way to construct a reasonable
operationalization, we used multiple approaches in order to establish the
sensitivity of our results to the particular form of the operationalization.
Because of evidence from recent data that actual peer group construction
is biased toward more highly compensated peers (Faulkender and Yang
2010; Pittinsky and DiPrete 2010), we also operationalize the idea that
corporation compensation committees often choose an “aspiration” instead
of a comparable peer group for the process of setting executive compen-
sation.
We presume a model of competitive benchmarking against peer groups
as described in the compensation literature. In every year, compensation
changes are based on a standard procedure. First, current pay is assessed.
Then a peer group is identified. A target distribution for the current year
is established on the basis of escalating the lagged compensation of ex-
ecutives in the peer group to what is judged to be a reasonable present
value. New compensation for the focal CEO is then determined relative
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to the compensation of CEOs in the peer group via negotiations with the
focal CEO.
Our four strategies for imputing peer groups are summarized in table
3. In each case, the coding cut points were chosen in order to assure that
a high fraction of peer groups would contain at least 10 firms, which is
consistent with guidelines from compensation consultants that peer groups
contain about 10–15 executives. Industry priority peer groups were de-
fined as companies in the same two-digit SIC industry category, which
was further divided into a top and bottom half on the basis of company
market value. Size priority peer groups were defined as companies in the
same decile based on market value that were located in the same one-
digit SIC industry category. Performance priority peer groups were cat-
egorized into four industry sectors crossed with market-value quintiles
crossed with return on asset quintiles. These first three definitions are
consistent with the norms put forward in the compensation literature
about the composition of peer groups. The fourth strategy—aspiration
peer groups—defined peer groups as the set of companies that were in
the same size priority peer group that the focal company would be in if
its market capitalization was one decile higher than actual.
We imputed peer groups under the assumption that ExecuComp firms
use other ExecuComp firms as peer groups, because these are the firms
for which we have historical data on executive compensation. With its
mix of the S&P Small-Cap 600, the S&P Mid-Cap 400, and the S&P 500,
the ExecuComp database covers the range of the public corporation pop-
ulation, but it is not a representative sample of this population. Because
all S&P 500 firms are included but only a sample of mid-cap and small-
cap firms are included, the ExecuComp firms as a group are larger and
more stable than other publicly traded firms.22 They also tend to have
greater institutional ownership and stronger incentive-oriented pay than
non-ExecuComp firms (Cadman et al. 2007). The fact of sampling guar-
antees that peer groups imputed from the ExecuComp database would
not match the actual peer groups even if firms chose their peer groups
on the basis of normative principles. We proceed under the assumption
that the ExecuComp data provide sufficiently broad coverage to provide
valuable insight into how firm-level compensation practices are affecting
macrolevel change over time.
At least in theory, the first three definitions of peer groups used in our
simulations would produce symmetric peer groups. In other words, every
company would be a peer for every other company in its peer group. This
would deviate from conventional practice, in which companies would
22 Together they constitute 22% of all firms in the Compustat database and 87% of




Definitions of Peer Groups
Peer Group Description
1. Industry priority
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Two-digit SIC codes define industry groups; each industry
group is divided into two peer groups (top and bottom
half ) based on market capitalization
2. Size priority . . . . . . One-digit SIC codes define industry groups; each industry
group is divided into 10 peer groups (deciles) based on
market capitalization
3. Performance . . . . . . Industries are divided into four large groups (agriculture,
mining, and construction; manufacturing and transporta-
tion; wholesale and retail trade; and finance, services, and
administration); each group is divided into quintiles based
on market capitalization, and each market-cap quintile is
divided into quintiles based on return on assets
4. Aspiration . . . . . . . . Peer groups are defined as in size priority; each year, execu-
tives are benchmarked against the companies in the same
industry that are one decile larger in terms of market
capitalization
sample from the full peer population (not just ExecuComp firms) in order
to obtain a peer group of about 10–15 firms. Our definitions also deviate
from our understanding of current (and probably also past) actual practice,
in which companies sometimes go outside of the normative peer popu-
lation when they construct ostensible peer groups (Pittinsky and DiPrete
2010). Because of sampling, companies would not typically have sym-
metric ties even if their peer group consisted of companies of similar size
in the same industry. The inclusion of companies outside the same size/
industry group would—we expect—further increase the extent of asym-
metry in peer group ties. Meanwhile, aspiration peer groups are clearly
not symmetric. The use of aspiration peer groups implies that the com-
pensation committees of the focal company choose other companies that
are larger than themselves as peers, and these companies choose still larger
companies as their peers.
As a practical matter, we operationalized the peer groups of at least
some of the companies as asymmetric with all four of our operationali-
zations in order to preclude the use of very small peer groups in our
simulations. Reda et al. (2008) argue that peer groups should consist of
about 10 or more companies, which is consistent with our own exami-
nation of recent data (Pittinsky and DiPrete 2010). In cases in which a
company’s peer group was smaller than 10 on the basis of each of our
formal criteria, we relaxed the operationalization by adopting a hierarchy
of strategies (first shifting to quintiles instead of deciles and then succes-
sively assigning one of the other peer group operationalizations until the
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size threshold was reached). These expansions of the peer group definition,
which affected about one in six companies, cause the definitions of peer
groups to be asymmetric using any of our four strategies for operation-
alizing peer groups.
Simulation Procedure
The first step in our procedure is to simulate the setting of CEO com-
pensation by benchmarking CEOs against their normative (imputed) peer
groups in order to recover a trend that approximates what is actually
found in the data. We apply this simulation first for total compensation
and then again for the combination of salary and bonus, and we did the
simulation separately for each of the four imputations of peer groups. We
presume that last year’s compensation for peer CEOs is observed by the
compensation committees and that they update this lagged compensation
distribution by a certain amount to bring it to present-day levels. We then
presume that compensation committees paid the CEO in each year ac-
cording to his actual rank in the compensation distribution of his peers.
As an important initial step, therefore,we compared the focal CEO’s com-
pensation in year t with the updated distribution of compensation in the
peer group, and we thereby identified the actual rank of every CEO in
his normative peer group. The ranks of CEOs within normative peer
groups in each year are empirical facts that are derived from the actual
data.
We then use these ranks as key input data in order to simulate pay
increases each year and thereby approximate the actual rate of increase
of the mean and median of the compensation distribution over time. We
call this step our baseline simulation and implement it as follows. From
the actual compensation of all CEOs in year , we computed the updatedt0
(and therefore simulated) distribution of compensation in the peer group
of each CEO for year using the yearly escalator. Taking the em-t  10
pirically given percentile of each executive within his peer group each
year as key input data, we assigned each CEO the mean of the compen-
sation at the decile lower and the decile higher than his own rank in his
peer group for year .23 After computing the pay for each CEO int  10
year in this way, we used this set of simulated compensations tot  10
23 We multiplied the compensation at the 10th percentile by a value less than one, and
we multiplied the compensation at the 90th percentile by a value greater than one in
order to obtain benchmark points for the two tails of the distribution. Along with the
escalator, these tail multipliers were chosen in order to track the mean, median, and
75th percentile of the actual compensation distribution over time. If the focal CEO is
ranked below the 10th percentile or above the 90th percentile within his peer group,
we set his new compensation at one of these tail values.
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obtain the distribution of pay within peer groups for year . Wet  20
continue this process for each year covered by the ExecuComp data,
always using observed ranks in one-year-updated real compensation dis-
tributions as key input data. To repeat, the goal of the baseline simulation
was to recover a rate of increase in the observed distribution of CEOs
that approximates the actual changes in the median, 75th percentile, and
mean of the distribution of compensation over time. If peer groups were
extremely large, our procedure would—by construction—exactly repro-
duce the observed compensation distribution in every year. However,
because peer groups are typically between 10 and 30 companies in size,
the compensation values we obtain through this process are only ap-
proximate, and therefore, we recover a reasonable approximation of the
changing distribution over time by tweaking the escalators and by tweak-
ing the scale values that are used to set pay below the 10th percentile
and above the 90th percentile.24
Having produced a baseline simulation that recovers the approximate
pattern of compensation change over time via an explicit benchmarking
mechanism, we then performed a series of counterfactual simulations to
estimate the effect of capping compensation for CEOs who moved to the
upper tail of their benchmark distributions. We did this in three ways,
each of which was progressively less restrictive, first for total compen-
sation and then for the sum of salary and bonus. We label these three
capping procedures as “stringent capping,” “performance-based capping,”
and “tenure- and performance-based capping” and implement them as
follows.
1. Stringent capping.—In the most restrictive capping, we limited com-
pensation increases to the 75th percentile of the escalated peer group
compensation distribution for CEOs who were ranked above the 80th
percentile of their peer group in year but were placed below thet 1
24 In a simpler set of baseline and counterfactual simulations, we made the assumption
that history was smooth, and we therefore used the same values for these parameters
each year. Our goal in this simpler simulation was to produce an overall rate of growth
in the median, 75th percentile, and mean compensation that approximated the actual
growth over our entire time window without the rise and fall surrounding the tech
stock crash. Because we obtain similar effects from leapfrogging in both scenarios, we
show only the graphs for the historically faithful trend. For simulations that attempted
to follow the actual rise, fall, and subsequent rise of compensation, we used the median
change in compensation between the lagged and the current year as the peer group–
specific escalator. In effect, we assumed that compensation committees would know
how compensation in their local environment was changing in each year and that they
would use this information to update the lagged benchmark data. For the smooth
compensation change simulations, we instead assumed that every compensation com-
mittee increased the lagged compensation data by 3% in real terms before bench-
marking.
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70th percentile of their peer group in year t. CEOs who were ranked
above the 80th percentile in compensation in the previous year were not
capped.
2. Performance-based capping.—The second, less restrictive form of
capping allowed leapfrogging based either on CEO performance or on
CEO mobility. We used logistic regression to predict the probability of
being placed above the 80th percentile in their peer group on the basis
of the market value of the company last year, the change in market value
of the company between last year and this year, and the change in the
average market value of companies in the peer group between last year
and this year. We then allowed leapfrogging for CEOs whose probability
of being placed above the 80th percentile on the basis of performance
was in the top 30% of all CEOs. In addition, we allow leapfrogging for
all CEOs who were CEOs in the lagged year and became CEO of a new
company in the current year. Other CEOs were subjected to stringent
capping as described above.
3. Tenure- and performance-based capping.—The third, still less restric-
tive, form of capping was to allow uncapped placement for all individuals
who became CEOs of a new company in the current year, regardless of
whether they were also CEOs in the lagged year. Other CEOs were sub-
jected to performance-based capping as described above.
For example, imagine a CEO in a company that, on the basis of one
of our operationalizations of peer groups, has about 15 peers, and let us
take the case of salary plus bonus (abbreviated as “pay”) as the compen-
sation component of interest and consider tenure- and performance-based
capping. Once the specific set of peers was determined, it became possible
to rank this focal CEO in each year with respect to his peer group. Let
us suppose that his ranking on pay in years , , , and was eighth,t t t t1 2 3 4
twelfth, fifteenth, and twelfth, which corresponds to the 50th percentile,
the 75th percentile, the 94th percentile, and the 75th percentile. Let us
further assume that—on the basis of the logistic regression described
above—his probability of being placed above the 80th percentile in his
peer group was in the 65th percentile of all predicted probabilities for
CEOs in year . In year , his pay would not be capped because it wast t3 1
at the 50th percentile. In year , his pay was at the 75th percentile, andt2
so again it would not be capped. If no one else in his peer group (whose
membership may have changed between times and ) was capped int t0 1
year , then the focal CEO’s pay in year would be identical to his payt t1 2
in the baseline simulation. If, however, other CEOs in the peer groupt1
had capped compensation according to the rules of tenure- and perfor-
mance-based capping, it would be possible for the focal CEO’s pay in
year to be affected because the 75th percentile (strictly speaking, thet2
average of the 70th and 80th percentiles) would be lowered if the com-
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pensation for the CEO at the 80th percentile in the year peer groupt1
had been capped that year, on the basis of his standing within his peer
group as constituted in year .t0
Once any particular focal CEO’s pay is affected by being benchmarked
against another CEO whose pay has been capped, it then affects the pay
of other CEOs who are benchmarked against him. Meanwhile, in year
, our focal CEO ranks at the 94th percentile of his escalated peert t3 2
group. In our example, his performance in year was not strong enought3
to merit being over the 80th percentile, but he is nonetheless not capped
in that year because he ranked highly enough in the distribution to bet2
exempt from capping. The capping of other CEOs, however, would con-
tinue to affect his pay from year to year because it affects the benchmark
distribution. If we changed this example only slightly to put our focal
CEO at the 50th percentile in year , then his inadequate performancet2
as of year would result in his pay being capped at the 75th percentilet t3 3
of his benchmark distribution. This capping of his pay would not di-t3
rectly affect his pay, which is set against the escalated pay of his peert t4 3
group. The capping of his pay would, however, affect the pay of othert3
CEOs depending on whether he was in their peer group and depending
on their rank relative to his rank in their benchmark distribution in that
year. In this manner, the capping of the pay of some CEOs percolates
through the system over time. Conversely, if we use the capped pay dis-
tribution as the baseline, the effects of leapfrogging are expressed as the
growing gap between the pay distribution in the baseline simulation and
the pay distribution in the tenure- plus performance-based capping dis-
tribution.
In any given year only about 5% of CEOs were capped by our least
strict criterion (see table 4). However, the identities of capped CEOs differ
from year to year. We determined that 26% of CEOs in the ExecuComp
distribution would have been capped either in their total compensation
or in their salary/bonus compensation at the 75th percentile of their bench-
mark distribution at some point in time during the years observable with
the ExecuComp data using industry priority peer groups. To rephrase,
about a quarter of CEOs were leapfroggers by one or the other of these
metrics in some year covered by the ExecuComp data. However, the
principal effect of leapfrogging on the compensation distribution occurs
via its cumulative effect over time as it affects the compensation of other
CEOs through the benchmarking process. Restating this in terms of com-
pensation capping, the cumulative effect of capping occurs because capped
CEO compensation affects the distribution of compensation in the bench-
mark distributions. It is this environmental effect that causes the sup-
pression of leapfrogging to affect compensation of other CEOs in our
simulations. Because we use actual ranking within normative peer groups
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TABLE 4













1993 . . . 186 29 29 1,113 2.6
1994 . . . 172 102 83 1,517 5.5
1995 . . . 149 126 99 1,565 6.3
1996 . . . 141 110 86 1,603 5.4
1997 . . . 136 86 67 1,636 4.1
1998 . . . 155 111 87 1,641 5.3
1999 . . . 158 108 78 1,720 4.5
2000 . . . 153 123 99 1,701 5.8
2001 . . . 143 134 94 1,597 5.9
2002 . . . 122 108 84 1,605 5.2
2003 . . . 128 110 82 1,630 5.0
2004 . . . 138 114 95 1,629 5.8
2005 . . . 145 122 94 1,625 5.8
as a key input variable, it follows that the capping of any particular CEO’s
compensation at the 75th percentile of the escalated benchmark distri-
bution would have no direct effect on his future compensation in our
simulation. Compensation in our model is not a function of base year
compensation, but only of the compensation of peers and one’s actual
rank in that benchmark distribution as computed each year from the
actual compensation data. The cumulative effects come from the spread-
ing impact of capping (alternatively, leapfrogging) on benchmark distri-
butions.
The effect of capping (alternatively, leapfrogging) spreads for several
reasons. Most directly, the capping of a fraction of CEOs in the right tail
of peer group distributions affects the compensation of other highly ranked
CEOs by modifying the right tail of the peer group distribution against
which they are benchmarked. The capping will gradually affect lower-
ranked CEOs as well through the process of change in the constitution
of the normative peer group. As the size (i.e., market value or, depending
on the specific operationalization, return on assets) of any specific firm
changes, it can grow or shrink into a different peer group. This process
will change the ranking of CEOs in the benchmark distributions. It will
change some CEOs from being relatively low ranked in their peer group
in year t to being higher ranked in year because their firms fall intot 1
a peer group made up of smaller firms. It will change some other CEOs
from being relatively high ranked in their peer groups in year t to being
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lower ranked in year because their firms grow into peer groups madet 1
up of larger firms. Furthermore, movements of some firms into larger- or
smaller-size classes between years t and will change the rank of thet 1
CEOs of other firms that do not change peer groups, because the mobility
of some firms changes the group of CEOs that other CEOs are ranked
against. This process of reconstitution of peer groups from one year to
the next will shift some capped CEOs to lower ranks than the 75th per-
centile and will therefore affect the compensation of CEOs who were
ranked below the right tail of their benchmark distribution. This process
of reconstitution causes the curtailing of leapfrogging to gradually spread
to other parts of the distribution of peer groups. Meanwhile, because the
capping process is occurring within different size classes through the
ExecuComp population, the impact of capping appears throughout the
population distribution of CEO compensation.
We expect that the feedback effects of capping (equivalently, leapfrog-
ging) would accumulate over time. How rapidly these effects accumulate,
of course, depends on the amount of capping. Thus, we expect the effects
of capping to be strongest under stringent capping and weakest under
tenure- and performance-based capping. The process by which peer
groups are formed is also expected to affect the impact of compensation
capping on the secular growth in compensation. The fact of leapfrogging
can be disguised through the use of aspiration peer groups; the higher
paid the asserted peer group, the lower a focal CEO will rank in this peer
group for any specific compensation package. Thus, even generous in-
creases in CEO compensation will not necessarily move a focal CEO into
the right tail of his benchmark distribution if the CEOs chosen for the
asserted peer group are sufficiently highly paid. Finally, because CEO
pay and company size are strongly correlated, one can obtain a highly
paid peer group by asserting an aspiration peer group of sufficiently large
companies.
RESULTS
As noted above, table 4 shows the number of individuals who were capped
at the 75th percentile of the industry priority peer groups. The right tail
of any particular peer group might be in the right tail of the overall
distribution. However, it might also be in the middle, or even below the
middle of the overall distribution of CEO compensation, depending on
how the compensation of the peer group CEOs compared with compen-
sation of CEOs in the broader population. Furthermore, and consistent
with figure 3, the highly dynamic character of executive compensation
causes the rank of CEOs in the overall compensation distribution to
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change from year to year. Figures 4 and 5 show the location of CEOs
who were ever capped according to our least strict criterion (tenure- and
performance-based capping) within the actual compensation distribution
of the ExecuComp CEO population, using industry priority peer groups.
In these figures, each CEO is scored by his rank within the population
of all CEOs for each year. All CEOs who were never capped were
dropped, and all years are dropped from the files of ever-capped CEOs
before the first time that compensation is capped. As is evident from these
figures, the modal position of ever-capped CEO compensation is near the
top of the population distribution, but a significant portion of the mass
of this distribution is also found in the second, third, and fourth quintiles.
Leapfrogging has the potential to influence the evolution of the entire
distribution of CEO compensation, even though the individual leapfrog-
ging events occur in the right tail of any particular peer group.
The extent of this influence is clarified through an examination of the
results of our counterfactual simulations. Figures 6 and 7 show the results
for mean total compensation and median total compensation for the four
representations of peer groups. The dotted line shows the actual change
in total compensation at the mean over time. The smooth line without
year markers (labeled “as simulated” in the legend) shows the movement
of the simulated compensation distribution, which, by construction, ap-
proximates the movement of the mean of the actual distribution. The
other three solid lines are the consequences of constraining compensation
by controlling leapfrogging as defined above.25 Because the ungoverned
simulated distribution cannot exactly match the true distribution, one
should compare the constrained simulations with the unconstrained sim-
ulation in order to assess the impact of capping leapfrog compensation
at the 75th percentile on the overall growth in executive compensation.
The specific quantitative features of these different growth curves depend
on the assumptions underlying each simulation and would vary if we
shifted these assumptions. We focus, therefore, on the qualitative com-
parisons, which are stable across the various simulations that we have
conducted.
Even when we use the least strict tenure- and performance-based cap-
ping, we see a considerably slower rate of growth of mean total compen-
sation when we restrict leapfroggers to the 75th percentile of their bench-
mark distributions. In each of the four panels, it can be seen that the rate
25 The bottom line in each graph in figs. 6–9 (diamond marked “capped”) corresponds
to “stringent capping” as defined in the text. The next-higher line (triangle marked
“win/move”) corresponds to “performance-based capping.” The next-higher line (circle
marked “win/move/new”) corresponds to “tenure- and performance-based capping.”
The “actual” line comes from the data, and the “as simulated” line comes from the
baseline simulation.
Fig. 4.—Rank of capped CEOs in the overall distribution: year of cap and subsequent
years.
Fig. 5.—Rank of pay-capped CEOs in the overall distribution: distribution over year of
cap and subsequent years.
Fig. 6.—Growth of simulated mean total compensation, by year
Fig. 7.—Growth of simulated median total compensation, by year
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of increase of mean total compensation would still have been very high
during the 13-year period, going from about $3 million in real terms in
1993 to nearly $5 million by 2005 for industry and size priority peer groups.
At the same time, it is apparent in each of the charts that leapfrogging
had a considerable effect on change in mean total compensation: up to
half of the growth is removed when leapfrogging is controlled. By com-
paring the size priority aspirations peer groups in the bottom right panel
with the size priority peer groups in the top right panel in figure 6, we
see that the effect of capping (and hence the effect of leapfrogging it-
self ) is diminished when aspiration peer groups are used for benchmark-
ing. The reason for this is obvious: the higher the compensation of the
benchmark distribution, the lower will be the ranking of the focal CEO
in that distribution. The size of his compensation increase depends both
on where he is placed in the peer distribution and on how elevated the
peer distribution is relative to his own compensation. Clearly, it would
be possible to have given almost all capped CEOs the very same com-
pensation that they did in fact receive but keep this compensation below
the 80th percentile of a peer distribution if sufficiently highly paid CEOs
were chosen as the peers. In our simulation, we used CEOs of companies
that were one decile larger in market cap as the way to operationalize
aspiration peer groups. With this choice, we see that the capping of com-
pensation jumps continues to have a noticeable effect on the rate of growth
of compensation. Had we chosen aspiration groups that were two deciles
ahead of the focal company, the effect of capping would no doubt have
diminished still further. Of course, placing a CEO in the middle of a
distribution of CEOs who are “peers” in name only obscures the jumps
but does not eliminate them.
Figure 7 shows growth at the median, which we put on the same scale
that was used for total compensation in figure 4. Median compensation
is clearly lower than mean compensation, which reflects the strong right
skew of total compensation in the ExecuComp database. Of principal
interest for our purposes, however, is that growth in median compensation
is also slowed by the capping of leapfrogging above the 80th percentile
within individual peer group distributions. Compensation practices in the
right tail of individual peer groups affect the entire distribution of CEO
compensation for companies within the ExecuComp data.
Figures 8 and 9 show similar graphs for trends in the salary/bonus
component of total compensation. The salary/bonus component of total
compensation is more stable across the careers of individual executives
than total compensation is because bonuses are typically earned every
year whereas long-term incentive payments were not awarded on a yearly
basis by many of the firms in the ExecuComp data. Figure 8 shows that
a considerable portion of the long-term gain in mean salary/bonus was
Fig. 8.—Growth of simulated mean salary plus bonus, by year
Fig. 9.—Growth of simulated median salary plus bonus, by year
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lost when leapfrogging behavior was constrained at the 75th percentile.
As for the case of total compensation, the impact of capping diminished
when aspiration peer groups were used instead of similar-firm peer groups.
Figure 9 shows that the use of aspiration peer groups one decile larger
in market cap than the focal company was sufficient to eliminate almost
all the effect of capping at the median of the salary/bonus distribution
over time.
The differing results obtained from the use of normative and from
aspiration peer groups arise most obviously because leapfrogging is nec-
essarily less common when aspiration peer groups are used and the bench-
mark distribution is thereby shifted upward. This fact is of great impor-
tance and highlights the dual mechanisms that can be used at the level
of specific firms to pay greater compensation to an executive. Either one
can locate an executive higher up in the normative benchmark distribution
or one can raise the mean of that distribution by composing it of higher-
paid executives. The percentage of leapfroggers that we display in table
4 almost certainly does not represent the actual number of lower-paid
executives who were overtly benchmarked above the 80th percentile of
their named peer group distribution because many or most of their firms
may have included higher-paid executives from outside the normative
peer group when constructing benchmarks. The use of aspiration peer
groups masks leapfrogging but amounts to the same thing for an executive
who receives outsize increases relative to the executives who constitute
his natural comparison group. Either way, these pay increases then have
systemwide implications as they diffuse to other executives through the
workings of the benchmarking system.
DISCUSSION
The process of compensation determination for executives is fundamen-
tally relational in character. Connections are drawn among a specific set
of actors and a focal executive at virtually all public corporations, and
compensation outcomes for the population of CEOs are dependent on the
structure of this network. However, the network that links executives
through peer comparisons in the process of pay setting is different from
the networks that are typically researched in economic sociology. The
networks in the work of scholars such as Baker (1984), Burt (1992), and
Mizruchi and Stearns (2001) represent a history of social interaction among
the tied individuals and are the bases for the flow of information, trust,
and other resources. In reputational models such as Podolny’s (2005), the
network ties are signaling devices that are widely advertised to a broader
audience. In the absence of direct information about quality, economic
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actors seek to associate with others who (are perceived to) have high
status and to avoid associating with those who (are perceived to) have
low status. The pattern of reciprocated association reinforces other in-
formation to define a status hierarchy. Status becomes a signal for quality
and the basis for charging a higher price and getting access to needed
resources at a lower cost. In all these types of networks, the relational
ties are behavioral in nature; they reflect relations that can be observed
in behavior such as supply chain transactions, joint ventures, board in-
terlocks, competitive bidding for the same customer account, or other
forms of social interaction.
The relational networks underlying the executive compensation system
are similar to both types of networks described above and yet have im-
portant qualitative differences as well. They are similar in that the ties
involve information, they involve claims to status and quality, and they
affect prices—in this case, the price of executive talent. However, the
network of relations that develops from firm-level peer group decisions
is not behavioral; it rests instead on the fundamentally cognitive process
of classification. While behavioral bases are available (e.g., talent flows),
firms select their compensation peer groups primarily on the basis of the
question “Whom are we like?” These abstract claims of status equivalence
differ from the ties in Podolny’s reputational models in that they are not
widely advertised and need not be reciprocated. It is not the recipient of
the asserted link—that is, the postulated peer CEO—who approves or
rejects the association as would be the case in Podolny’s model, but rather
the compensation committee and the board of directors. In Podolny’s
model, the reciprocated tie must be advertised to gain the status benefits
and the economic returns that follow from status. In compensation bench-
marking, the asserted and often not-reciprocated association need be
known only to the compensation committee and the board. The economic
returns are produced when the board accepts the appropriateness of the
proposed relations and when it accepts the proposed placement of the
focal CEO’s compensation within this benchmark distribution.
We have no doubt that in some cases, peer group ties correspond to
actual social ties (CEOs in the same industry and size class typically know
each other). We also do not doubt that the selection of peers outside the
normative group may have an explanation in terms of social ties; for
example, a peer group may include peers from a different industry that
happens to be the industry of a member of the compensation committee.26
However, the compensation information need not flow through such con-
crete social ties because it is available from other sources, such as, for
example, the compensation consultant, or more generally through the
26 This was related to us by a knowledgeable source.
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proxy reports that are freely available for all public corporations because
they are filed with the SEC. The potential relevance of behavioral ties
concerns the partly rhetorical process of convincing the board that the
peer group is appropriate; this may be easier if a board member from a
different industry argues that CEOs from that different industry are ap-
propriate comparisons for the focal company’s CEO for thus and so rea-
sons. To repeat, behavioral ties may certainly matter in the compensation-
setting process, but the peer networks themselves are abstract and
potentially unreciprocated assertions about labor market equivalence.
Until recently, peer group information was not overtly used by CEOs
to enhance status apart from its impact on their own compensation. While
CEOs could have always included such information in corporate proxy
reports, this reporting has only recently become common. That the
changed behavior was a response to new regulations issued by the SEC
suggests that CEOs saw no advantage and possibly a disadvantage in
advertising the composition of the peer group that was being used for
compensation setting. In an important sense, their actions were the op-
posite of the process of advertising ties that is essential to the enhancement
(or degradation) of status in Podolny’s model and to resulting conse-
quences for prices, costs, and transactions. One reason for this only re-
cently abandoned circumspection may be that wider publicity for the
assertions of labor market equivalence implicit in the peer group—and
in the relative placement of the focal CEO within this group—would lead
not to a further rise in status as in Podolny’s model, but rather to chal-
lenges of the legitimacy of these assertions by shareholders. Secrecy rather
than publicity may have been in the greater interest of CEOs in the context
of compensation setting because the asserted cognitive relationships were
not necessarily reaffirmed by the firms of CEO peers and because these
asserted relationships did not necessarily correspond to other structural
criteria for defining the appropriate labor market and a CEO’s appro-
priate place within this market.
The results of this article reinforce the importance of what Coleman
(1986) referred to as “micro-to-macro” models in order to account for
behavioral outcomes. The literature on executive compensation recognizes
that the framework for corporate governance as it applies to executive
compensation derives from tax and regulatory authorities and is therefore
national in scope even as the details and effectiveness of corporate gov-
ernance vary by firm. This governance process requires that compensation
committees pay attention to the behavior of other firms when making
their decisions. In form, the executive compensation literature is similar
to much of the economic sociology literature, which generally pays at-
tention to broad environmental context (e.g., resource dependence theory
[Aldrich 1979] or Fligstein’s [2002] “political-cultural” approach), and to
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the ways in which heterogeneous actors pay attention to the behavior of
other actors in their environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Coleman
argued that models such as these reflect the omnipresent macro-to-micro
processes that cause individual behavior to be constrained by the social
environment. He further argues that the obverse micro-to-macro process,
which he termed “the means by which purposive actions of individuals
combine to produce a social outcome” (1986, p. 1321), is also always
present in social action but is generally underdeveloped in social science
theories. In the case of executive compensation, the purposive action that
forms the micro-to-macro link is rent seeking on the part of individual
executives. This rent seeking, when combined with individual firm-level
problems in corporate governance or even when combined with random
shocks, affects the environment as well as the outcomes for that individual.
Corporate governance affects rent seeking, but rent seeking also affects
governance in such a way that even good governance leads to higher rent
extraction. A full elaboration of this feedback loop between purposive
action and the environment remains underdeveloped in many other prob-
lems of long-standing interest in economic sociology (e.g., the study of
merger waves), just as it does in the study of rent extraction in general
and of executive compensation in particular. Other scholars (e.g., DiPrete
2007; Levy and Temin 2007; Morgan and Tang 2007) have argued that
institutions matter for the evolution of the compensation structure at the
lower end of the earnings distribution. In the context of the current article,
we would conclude that a comprehensive explanation for inequality trends
in industrial countries must involve a study of the institutional dynamics
that affect both higher-earning and lower-earning occupations (see also
Zhou 1993; Weeden 2002).
Lacking specific information about the peer groups that firms histori-
cally used or purported to use, we took the conservative route of imputing
normatively prescribed peer groups to explore mechanisms by which the
use of “legitimate” means for establishing the market wage actually can
produce growing rent extraction over time. Changes in the regulatory
framework after the Enron and WorldCom scandals have pressured pub-
lic corporations to reveal their peer groups in yearly proxy reports, which
allows more careful study of how feedback between microlevel bargaining
and the environment occurs. Moreover, public knowledge of peer groups
may also change the nature of this feedback loop through counter pres-
sures to deny the legitimacy of the more “aspirational” peer assertions
and, more generally, to strengthen standards for how to choose an ap-
propriate peer group for benchmarking purposes. Pressure to limit ex-
ecutive compensation has increased still more following the onset of the
financial crisis of 2008. Whether these events have a lasting impact on
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either the process of compensation setting or its outcomes is an important
question for future research.
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